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Abstract  
This paper studies whether microfinance rating agencies were able to impose market discipline 
on microfinance institutions (MFIs) during the period 1998-2002. Results indicate that not all 
rating agencies had equal impact. While some rating agencies were able to promote better 
sustainability, there is some weak evidence that rating by a particular rater might have induce 
moral hazard, whereby after receiving good rating, MFIs had worse performance perhaps 
because in some regions several raters operated simultaneously. Evidence also suggests that 
subsidized rating does not encourage improvements in sustainability and has negative impact on 




Development of financial institutions boosts economic growth and, moreover, benefits the poor 
more than other segments of the population (King and Levine, 1993; Beck et al., 2004). 
Worldwide, microfinance institutions (MFIs) expand the frontier of finance by providing loans 
and other financial services to the under-served entrepreneurial poor. In recognition of the 
microfinance industry’s impact, and in an effort to attract more attention by governments and 
potential donors, the United Nations proclaimed 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit. 
The emergence and growth of a number of agencies specializing in rating MFIs indicate 
that the industry has reached a certain level of maturity (The Economist, November 6
th 2005).  
Given the lack of developed equity and debt markets, donors and investors could benefit from 
independent evaluation of the performance of MFIs.  Microfinance institutions themselves could 
benefit from rating if it helps them attract additional funds. Furthermore, some managers report 
that in the absence of sufficient technical assistance subsidized rating could help identify 
shortcomings and areas that need improvement. To date, however, the impact of rating on MFIs’ 
performance and their ability to raise funds has not been explored.  This paper focuses on these   3
issues by analyzing a new database containing financial and outreach information of MFIs from 
62 countries and data collected from microfinance rating agencies.  
Well-run microfinance institutions make better use of scarce funds by providing better 
financial services and reaching more poor clients. Exploring whether microfinance rating 
improves MFIs’ performance is important because there are few alternative mechanisms that 
promote MFI accountability.  Recent study found that about 90% of the one billion dollars that 
funded microfinance initiatives up to 2004 has come from public sources, mainly from taxpayers 
in developed countries (CGAP, 2004).  Donors and investors in microfinance are searching for 
effective mechanisms of external control and some have focused on rating.  To support rating of 
MFIs, in 2001, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) established a special fund 
with the purpose to subsidize rating of MFIs (see http//:www.ratingfund.org).  Thus, from policy 
perspective, a study on the impact of microfinance rating agencies and their ability to serve as an 
effective mechanism of external control is timely and important.  
The purpose of microfinance rating agencies is to generate independent information, 
which could be used by existing stakeholders to improve governance, and by potential lenders to 
make appropriate lending decisions. However, rating could also lead to moral hazard, at least in 
short term. This could happen if microfinance rating is not a continuous evaluation of MFIs’ 
creditworthiness but a one-time event, since it may induce managers of MFIs who have received 
good rating and, as a result, secured financial support, to slack off and exercise less effort in the 
consequent period(s). In addition, similarly to mainstream rating agencies, microfinance rating 
agencies have little competition and, since most have both consulting and rating operations, are 
rigged with conflict of interest problems (The Economist, May 26, 2005).    4
Exploring the role of rating in microfinance is also important in the context of the 
discussion on the ability of market forces to discipline financial intermediaries.  Specifically, this 
literature focuses on the consequences of interactions between regulator-imposed rules, rating 
agency signals, and market discipline (Sironi, 2003). These issues are especially relevant in 
microfinance, where market discipline through equity prices is non-existent and through debt 
prices is weak because regulators and donors may create significant distortions. 
This paper develops a new database of about 130 MFIs operating in 62 countries and 
analyses their performance by adopting an empirical approach used in studies on the impact of 
market forces, rating, and regulation on performance of financial intermediaries.  The main 
conclusion is that the rating agencies differ greatly in their impact on MFI performance and 
ability to raise funds.  The evidence on the impact of subsidized rating is somewhat weak but it 
indicates that subsidizing may induce behavior consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section two reviews the literature on rating 
as it applies to microfinance raters, section three describes the empirical specifications, section 
four describes the data, section five discusses the results, and section six offers concluding 
remarks.   
 
Review of the Relevant Literature  
Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s help impose market discipline by 
rating companies’ creditworthiness (and probability of default) which in turn affects their 
securities prices. A survey of recent developments of credit rating research is published in a 
special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance, 2004. In its editorial, Cantor states that, 
although research has produced valuable insights, some important issues are still outstanding.   5
These include identifying the natural structure of the industry (oligopoly or more competition), 
understanding whether ratings in regulation entrench existing players or subsidize marginal 
players, how raters should be paid, and whether the stability of rating agencies and their lag in 
following securities prices diminish or enhance the rating’s usefulness (Cantor, 2004 p.2572) 
Most of the research on credit rating focused on non-financial firms, although credit 
rating agencies also rate financial intermediaries usually because regulators require it for some 
types of activities.  For example, in the US banks need rating to issue letters of credit (De Young 
et al., 2001). Since financial intermediaries are subject to regulations and supervision, and since 
the regulator may provide explicit or implicit guarantees (for example, that the bank will be 
recapitalized to protect a country’s payment system), credit ratings may fail to play its usual 
disciplining role. While some empirical evidence suggests that rating agencies are able to 
discipline banks as well as non-financial firms, the main contribution of rating agencies may be 
to help regulators identify problem banks (Morgan and Stiroh, 2000; Morgan, 2002). It is yet 
unknown if microfinance rating can impose market discipline given that donors also serve as 
creditors and equity providers and may choose to recapitalize a failing institution that serves 
important outreach mission and, thus, diminish the disciplining role of credit rating.  
Cross-country empirical studies on the impact of credit ratings are rare.  For the case of 
European banks, Sironi (2003) finds that rating helps impose market discipline, to a lesser extent 
on banks with external subsidies and public sector banks. However, the ability of rating agencies 
to influence firm performance in developing countries may be limited as there is evidence that 
credit rating agencies underinvest in information collection in these countries (Ferri, 2004).  
Rating in microfinance is new and understanding what works and what does not is 
important. For example, microfinance rating is now voluntary but there is a tendency to make it   6
more common and even compulsory, although theoretical research supports voluntary rating and 
is against compulsory rating (Nayar, 1993). Microfinance raters usually conduct a one-time 
rating and do not issue consequent updates unless an MFI requested it (and pays for it). One 
exception was M-CRIL whose rating is valid only for one year. Boot, Milbourn, and Schmeits 
(2004) show, however, that continuous monitoring and the mechanism of CreditWatch in 
particular play a major role in disciplining management.  
In addition, Mukhopadhyay (2003) shows that rating agencies may create moral hazard—
once the firm is rated, and funds are secured, managers may lose the incentives to exercise 
maximum effort and may slack off.  He shows that, to remove the moral hazard problem, it is 
sufficient to offer payments to the rating agency based on expected returns on the debt.  
The ability of credit rating agencies to impose market discipline may also be hindered by 
the inherent conflict of interest. For example, most microfinance rating agencies have both 
consulting and rating departments and there is no information on whether these are sufficiently 
independent. However, while S&P and Moody’s are by far the most influential general raters, in 
microfinance there is more competition among raters with half a dozen raters operating during 
the study period.  
 
Empirical Specifications 
The literature on rating suggests testable hypotheses for the impact of rating on MFI 
performance.  However, the empirical methodologies used in this literature cannot directly be 
applied to rating in microfinance because MFIs differ from banks and other financial 
intermediaries.  For example, the asset base of most MFIs was created through grants by donors 
and MFIs do not have widely held equity and are not publicly traded companies.  Moreover,   7
MFIs do not usually issue bonds, do not necessarily collect deposits, and may or may not be 
regulated.  Although the main stakeholders –donors—do not require dividends, they usually 
continue to monitor the MFI they created.  
As in other organizations, an MFI will survive if it is able to raise funds and have 
sufficient liquidity to meet current obligations. Therefore, the willingness of donors and other 
creditors to provide liquidity and fund future projects is important. MFI creditors seek 
information on MFI performance to ensure that their lending is prudent.  These stakeholders base 
their decisions on information on the performance of MFIs, usually available through audited 
financial statements. In addition to this information, rating provided by independent market 
participants may affect the willingness of potential equity holders, donors and creditors to fund 
an MFI. Thus, rating in microfinance may play the same disciplining role as rating in banks and 
other financial institutions. 
Microfinance institutions have a mission to serve the poor and the emphasis on outreach 
is also important.  Microfinance rating agencies develop methodologies that focus on the overall 
performance of the organization in terms of both outreach and sustainability.  Thus, studies on 
the impact of rating in microfinance should account for the impact of rating on MFI outreach. 
As many MFIs are regulated, regulatory involvement may affect the ability of rating 
agencies to help discipline MFI managers.  In banking, the regulator may distort market signals 
because of the implicit guarantee that, to prevent bank runs, the regulator may rescue a bank if it 
does not do very well (Sironi, 2003).  In microfinance, similar guarantees may be expected by 
donors who care about the mission of the organization and may provide implicit “guarantees” 
that the MFI can be recapitalized after bad performance. Therefore, all MFIs—regulated, NGO,   8
and non-bank financial institution—may be subject to such distortions, and thus the value of the 
information provided by a rating agency may be diminished. 
While, in general, rating agencies rate debt and the probability of default on a continuous 
basis, rating in microfinance is more spaced in time and may be expected to be valid for a longer 
period of time, unless otherwise stated (as in the case of M-CRIL).  In addition, unlike rating in 
other industries, rating of MFIs has been of a more descriptive nature, whereby the reports 
provide an overview and assessment of the achievement (both outreach and sustainability) of the 
MFI and how these achievements compare to that of other MFIs in the area.  
Rating methodologies differ significantly across raters, and all are multidimensional, in 
most cases evaluating each sub-category.  For example, ACCION provides overall assessment of 
the MFI performance and uses the CAMEL evaluation methodology (Capital, Assets, 
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) employed by US bank regulators (FDIC) to evaluate the 
safety and soundness of banks. PlaNet Rating used its G.I.R.A.F.E. methodology (governance 
and decision making processes; information and management tools; risks analysis and control; 
activities and loan portfolio; funding: equity and liabilities; and efficiency and liability). M-
CRIL rates governance, managerial factors, financial performance and focuses on outreach 
indicators such as dropout rates, etc. During the study period, MicroRate did not have typical 
rating scale but had a distinct methodology that compared MFI’s performance to that of other 
MFIs and provided in-depth description and assessment for future potential including risk 
factors.  
During the study period, raters did not provide an overall evaluation that can be 
summarized with a letter grade perhaps because merging performance when MFIs pursue both outreach and sustainability is not trivial.  Only in 2003 most rating agencies adopted rating 
which results in an overall letter grade and the discussion on the pros and cons is still ongoing.
1  
These considerations do not permit the application of empirical methods that compare 
changes in security prices, changes in rating, and company performance to establish whether 
rating functioned as a disciplining device for this period.  Therefore, this paper adopts an 
empirical approach usually employed to study bank performance (Molyneux et al., 1992; 
Samolyk, 1994; Barth et al., 2003).   
The literature on rating suggests that rated MFIs may perform better if rating functions as 
an effective disciplining device, or slack off if rating induces moral hazard. The first null 
hypothesis to be tested then is that there is no link between rating and performance.  A rejection 
of this hypothesis and a statistically significant positive link between rating and performance 
indicates that rating imposes market discipline, while a negative link indicates moral hazard. To 
test this hypothesis, the following model is estimated: 
= it P constant it t t it M R B ε φ β α + ′ + ′ + ′ +      (1) 
where Pit is a performance variable for MFI i at time t. Bit is a vector of MFI specific variables 
which control for the level of capitalization such as capital ratio (CAPITAL) and focus on 
lending through loans-to-total-assets ratio (LOAN), the level of  risk through the portfolio-at-risk 
(PAR), MFI size (SIZE) and age (AGE). Rt is a vector of variables that control for rating in the 
current year (based on past year performance) and include a dummy for being rated (RATING) 
and, as an alternative, separate dummies for each specific rater, ACCION , M-CRIL, MicroRate, 
Microfinanza Ltd, PlaNet Rating, as well as a dummy for subsidized rating (FinAid). Mt are 
macroeconomic country-specific variables, such as inflation and availability of deposit insurance 
to protect the interest of depositors in MFIs that collect deposits. Since empirical evidence shows 
  9that changes in sovereign rating affects local market returns, country and year dummies are 
included to control for such potential impact (Brooks et al., 2004). 
The empirical analysis includes dummies for individual raters to control for the quality of 
the rater because studies have shown that credit agencies differ in their evaluation of regulated 
financial intermediaries (Morgan, 2002).  In addition, since MFIs have a dual objective—
outreach and sustainability—individual microfinance raters may place different values on these 
performance indicators.  To study the impact of rating on both outreach and sustainability, the 
empirical model is estimated with sustainability indicator (OSS) and outreach indicator (NAB) 
used as explanatory variables. 
Rating will play a disciplining role if it helps managers to raise additional funds.  The 
second null hypothesis will be that rated MFIs were not able to raise additional funds either 
through increase in equity or through increase in borrowed funds. Hence, the second empirical 
model that is estimated is: 
= it ChF constant it t t it M R B ε φ β α + ′ + ′ + ′ + −1      (2) 
where ChFit is the log difference of the change in funds and the other variables are as before. In 
this equation, all MFI specific variables are lagged one period. Two dependent variables are 
used. The first one is the log difference in borrowed funds other than deposits (LiabCh) used in 
order to study the impact of rating on the ability of MFIs to attract loans. The second is the log 
difference in equity (EqCh), which captures the ability of MFIs to raise additional equity. 
 
Data 
Data for this study come from several sources. Individual MFI data come from the database 
collected by MIX MARKET information platform (www.mixmarket.org).  To date, this is the 
  10  11
most detailed publicly available data on financial and outreach performance of microfinance 
institutions.  At the time of data collection, it had listed the profiles of more than 130 MFIs from 
over 62 countries for the period 1998-2002, which resulted in about 350 individual annual MFI 
observations.  
Rating data were collected from several sources. First, the CGAP Rating Fund 
(www.ratingfund.org) lists MFI name, rater and the year in which rating was conducted for all 
MFIs that received financial support for the rating.  For the years up to 2002, this database 
included the following raters: ACCION, M-CRIL, Microfinanza Ltd Ltd., MicroRate, and Planet 
Rating.  These raters were contacted and kindly provided data on what organization they rated 
and in what year.
2  Their data were merged with the data profiles of individual MFIs from the 
MIX MARKET information exchange platform.
 3   
Rating is recorded for the year for which it was conducted but, in most cases, rating was 
based on financial statements for the preceding years.  For example, if an MFI was rated in 2000 
it was recorded as rated in 2000, although the rater actually used financial statements for the 
years up to and including 1999.  All raters who provided information confirmed that, in most 
cases, pervious years’ financial statements were used.  In cases of mid-year rating, the rater used 
past years as well as current mid-year indicators of performance.  This recording of rating 
permits studying the impact of rating on performance in the period after rating occurred and for 
which data was available. 
A study of the impact of rating must rely on an appropriate control group.  The data 
collected by MIX MARKET are very appropriate for this purpose.  MFIs with listed financial 
and outreach profiles (and in many cases posted audited financial statements) have elected to 
participate usually motivated by the possibility that potential investors may review their profile   12
and select them for funding.  Thus, all listed MFIs have identified themselves as seeking funds 
and as being more transparent than MFIs that did not provide profiles.  Among these MFIs, not 
all were rated, which permits studying the impact of rating.  While raters provided complete 
information of the MFIs they rated, only a part of each rater’s clients were also part of the MIX 
MARKET database.  Therefore, this paper assumes that the resulting database represents a 
relatively random sample of MFIs that are transparent in their transactions and some of whom 
have experience with rating and some of whom do not.  
The MFIs in the sample are relatively evenly distributed across time—15 percent of the 
annual observations are from 1998, 22 percent are from 1999, 25 from 2000, 21 percent from 
2001, and 17 percent in 2003. Most of the ratings (60 percent) have occurred in 2001 & 2002, 
while about 40 percent of the annual observations are from this period. This concentration of 
rating in the last 2 years of the study period is consistent with the industry developments as 
rating has become more popular since 2001.  
Table 1 shows the distribution of MFIs by geographic regions as well as the regions 
served by raters during the study period. In the sample, Latin America (LA) and Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA) are the regions with the highest concentration of raters (in each, 3 raters 
were active), while in only one rater is represented in this sample.
4 Regional sub-samples were 
also created and used to re-estimate (1) and (2). Year and country dummies were included in the 
analysis to partial out the impact of time and country specific characteristics. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2 presents definitions of the variables used in the analysis.  Performance is 
measured in terms of sustainability and outreach. Sustainability is measured by operational self-
sustainability (OSS), which measures how well the MFI can cover its costs through operating   13
revenues and is the industry’s most widely used indicator of performance.
5  MFI performance in 
terms of outreach is measured by the log of the number of active borrowers (NAB), which is the 
number of individuals that currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI.
6  Log 
difference of equity (EqCh) and log difference of liabilities (LiabCh) are used to study whether 
rating helps MFIs raise more funds.
7   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The core explanatory variables are measures of capital ratio (CAPITAL), MFI age (AGE) 
and MFIs size measured as the log of total assets (SIZE), loans-to-asset ratio (LOAN), and 
savings (deposits) ratio (SAVINGS).
8   Inflation (INFLATION) and country dummies control for 
the impact of general economic conditions.
9  Among the variables representing MFIs’ profiles 
(excluding age), SIZE is not a ratio; thus, the value of total assets using SIZE is adjusted for 
inflation using the US CPI.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
years when the MFIs were not rated versus years when the MFIs were rated, and by rater.  The 
table is organized in two panels: Panel A presents the summary statistics of current year 
individual MFI profiles used in the estimation of (1), and Panel B presents the summary statistics 
of previous (lagged) year individual MFI profiles used in the estimation of (2). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
During the study period, of the 139 MFIs, 37 were rated at least once.  In total, the 
database contains 54 ratings, including 39 ratings that received financial support from the CGAP 
Rating Fund.  At the time of rating, rated MFIs had higher OSS, NAB, and loan-to-assets ratios, 
they were older and larger.  However, there is no statistically significant difference between the 
rated and non-rated groups in terms of their capital structure and risk profile measured by the   14
portfolio-at-risk variable and in terms of changes in equity and liability.  There is significant 
variation in the means of the variables of MFIs rated by various raters which suggests that the 
analysis should control for the use of a specific rater. 
 
Discussion of the results 
Results from estimation of (1) with performance measured in terms of sustainability, that is, with 
OSS as the dependent variable, are presented in Table 4.  Results from estimation of (1) with 
NAB as a measure the impact of rating on outreach are presented in Table 5. Estimation was 
done using the worldwide sample as well as sub-samples for all regions. However, in order to 
save space, results from models of regions with too few observations or poorly fitting models 
(Asia and Africa) are not shown. Thus, each table presents results from the estimation using first 
the whole dataset and, next, using data from the two sub-regions for which adequate number of 
observations is available. These regions are Latin America and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Breusch-Pagan tests shown at the bottom of these tables indicate that the random effect model is 
appropriate.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Model 1 in Table 4 represents a specification where the impact of rating is captured by 
RATING—the simple dummy variable for rating—while Model 2 is a specification with FinAid, 
the dummy variable for subsidized rating.
10 These two models indicate that rating and subsidized 
rating had no effect on sustainability in the pooled (worldwide) sample, thus in a model where 
all raters are treated as equal, the first null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In Latin America, 
however, MFIs that obtained subsidized rating had 0.15 percentage point higher OSS in the next 
period.    15
Results from specifications that include dummies for individual raters suggest that not all 
raters have the same effect on MFIs (Models 3 and 4). This is not surprising given that individual 
microfinance raters employ different rating methodologies. While most coefficients are positive 
not all are significant in the worldwide sample. In the Latin American sub-sample, however, 
MFIs rated by ACCION had higher OSS by 0.25 percentage points and the null can be rejected 
in favor of a one sided alternative that rating has positive impact.
11, 12
More importantly, rating by some raters may be associated with a negative performance 
at least in the short term, as the coefficient on the dummy for rating by Microfinanza Ltd is 
negative and statistically significant. These results are relatively robust to alternative 
specifications in the worldwide sample (in Model 4, the result is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level for a one-sided t test) while in the sub-sample of MFIs operating in ECA the results 
is close to significant at the 10 percent, with p value of the one sided t-test of 0.13.  
In 2002, Microfinanza Ltd used overall letter grades and MFIs in the sample received 
good grades—on 10 grid-scale, all MFIs rated by this rater received a rating of A (which comes 
third after AAA, and AA). All except one of these observations come from the database on 
subsidized ratings since Microfinanza Ltd neither supplied information on non-subsidized rating 
nor explained whether such is available; hence these results should be interpreted with caution. 
Yet, Microfinanza Ltd operated in regions with at least three raters and results may suggest that 
when the local rating industry is competitive, and given that raters serve as both raters and 
consultants, rating may not be the best disciplining mechanism.  
The economic impact of rating by various raters is also significant. According to Model 
4, compared to the rest of the sample, the OSS of MFIs rated by Microfinanza Ltd were 0.54 
percent points less in the period following rating.  On the other hand, everything else equal, the   16
OSS of Latin American MFIs increased by 0.67 points in the period following rating by 
ACCION. 
Overall, the specifications in Table 4 fit the data reasonably well as indicated by the high 
R-squared of around 0.5, thus providing support for the use of this approach to study MFI 
performance.  Results also indicate that the MFIs’ level capitalization, size and focus on lending 
(higher LOAN value) do not have a statistically significant impact on performance and the 
relationship between MFIs’ risk profile (PAR) and performance especially across regions is not 
consistent. Older MFIs have better sustainability but the impact of age is reversed after the 12-15 
years in the worldwide sample, although the reversal is different for each region (for example, 
about 5 years in the ECA).  
Except for the MFIs in Latin America, results show that MFIs have learned to operate in 
inflationary environment and to use inflation to their advantage as indicated by the positive and 
significant sign on the inflation coefficient, consistent with results from cross-country studies on 
financial intermediaries (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine, 2004; Barth et al., 2003). 
Evidence suggests that there is positive impact of deposit insurance on MFI performance. 
According to Model 4, even after controlling for the country, year, and inflation effects, MFIs 
operating in a country with deposit insurance scheme such as India have 0.25 percentage point 
higher OSS than MFIs operating in a country without deposit insurance scheme such as Pakistan. 
Considering the impact of rating on outreach, it seems that, while rating has a positive 
and significant effect on outreach, individual raters did not have any effect (Table 5).
13  In 
general, the magnitude of the impact is significant—rated MFIs reached 18.4 % more borrowers 
in the period following rating than non-rated MFIs. For the Latin American sub-sample, the 
magnitude is this impact is much larger – 41.9 percent. While overall subsidizing rating did not   17
seem to affect outreach, MFIs in the ECA that got financial aid for their rating had 33.6 percent 
lower outreach.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
The size of the MFIs is positively related to outreach: one percent increase in total assets 
improves outreach by 0.78 percent (both size and number are in log form). As expected, MFIs 
with higher loan-to-total assets ratios reach more borrowers. However, age, organizational type 
(NGO, Bank etc), and country inflation levels have no impact on outreach.     
Rating agencies also differ in terms of their effect on the MFIs’ ability to attract 
additional funding.  Results from estimation of (2) with LiabCh as the dependent variable are in 
Table 6; results form estimation of (2) with EqCh as the dependent variable are in Table 7.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Results in Table 6 confirm the hypothesis that simply being rated is not sufficient to help 
MFIs attract additional resources as the coefficients on RATING and FinAid are not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications. The results indicate that it matters who does the rating. 
The coefficients on the dummies for various raters are both negative and positive. MFIs rated by 
PlaNet Rating were able to borrow more resources in the period following rating as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant coefficients. These results hold for the worldwide sample 
and for the sample of the ECA region. For the Latin American sample, the coefficients on the 
dummy variables for rating by ACCION and MicroRate are negative but not statistically 
significant. 
As expected, better capitalized MFIs were able to raise more debt.  MFIs in countries 
with deposit insurance raised more debt perhaps because big lenders felt that the government 
guarantees of deposits decrease the overall default risk.  Only MFIs in Eastern Europe and   18
Central Asia were able to borrow more in the face of high inflation and MFI that had higher 
proportion of savings to total assets also raised more non-deposit liabilities.  
Table 7 shows the impact of rating on the MFIs’ ability to attract additional equity. These 
results are complementary to results in Table 6, where the dependent variable was change in 
non-deposit liabilities. These results are also consistent with the idea that the choice of a rater 
affects MFIs’ ability to raise additional funds. While the coefficients on rating and subsidized 
rating are not statistically significant in any of the specifications, MFIs in LA rated by ACCION 
attracted more equity. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on PlaNet Rating 
(Model 4) is consistent with the positive coefficient at the dummy for this rater in the estimation 
of the log change in liabilities.
14
The results from this analysis should be interpreted with caution for several reasons. 
First, data constraints do not permit to test whether the grade an MFI received affects its 
performance and ability to raise funds.  Specifically, it is not possible to tell whether an MFI 
with better rating has more incentives to improve than an MFI with worse rating; results only 
show that a rating by Microfinanza Ltd of MFIs operating in may have had negative impact.   
Second, the data quality is also an issue, as about 25 MFIs provided data only prior to 
rating but not after rating, which makes the results more dependent on rating up to 2001, and 
thus valid for this specific time period.  Since the industry has evolved substantially since 2001, 
more recent data, larger sample and, if possible, unified letter grades of the specific MFI rating 
would help better understand the impact of rating in microfinance.  
 
Conclusions   
In spite of the fact that developed countries have invested about $900 million in microfinance,   19
very little is known about the effectiveness of the mechanisms designed to exercise control over 
the use of these resources.  This paper focuses on studying the ability of microfinance rating 
agencies to impose market discipline on microfinance institutions and their managers by rating 
these organizations’ performance.  
Overall, results indicate that microfinance rating may help impose market discipline as it 
affected MFIs’ outreach and sustainability and their ability to raise funds, while subsidized rating 
may not have been appropriate, at least not in the ECA region. The main result is, however, that 
not all rating agencies are equal and that simply having a rating affects positively consequent 
outreach but not necessarily sustainability. In fact, there is some evidence for the moral hazard 
argument, namely that after receiving a good rating by a particular rater, some MFIs may slack 
off and show worse financial results. This result may provide support to the argument that less 
competition in the industry may be preferable, because the rater associated with moral hazard 
operated in a market where at least two other raters operated. Since this issue if very important 
for policy purposes, and since the result is only valid for a specific time period and regions it 
needs to be further addressed with better data and for other regions. 
Future work may need to focus on the impact of conflict of interest within microfinance 
raters, since conflicts of interest may drive some of the results in this paper. While some 
organizations may be able to isolate these functions, others may not. For example, while both 
PlaNet Rate and Microfinanza Ltd have a 60/40 mix of rating and consulting, only rating by the 
latter is associated with a moral hazard effect.  
Microfinance raters are converging toward an overall numerical or letter grade system, 
and it remains important to study how well each raters’ system is able to correctly predict risk 
and affect MFIs ability to raise funds. When more and more recent data become available,   20
further studies on microfinance rating need to use these newly introduced numerical and letter 
grades to identify rating methodologies that are most effective in imposing market discipline.   21
                                                
ENDNOTES 
 
1 This information is based on personal correspondence with two microfinance raters. 
2 Microfinanza was the only rater that did not provide private information but referred to the ratingfund wabpage. 
One observation of rating by Microfinanza came from the MIXMARKET data base.  
3 All information on rating and time of the rating comes from the raters themselves.  This is important because the 
MIX MARKET data contains information on rating but this information is incomplete (there is no specific date of 
rating, and in some cases, MFIs failed to disclose a second rater, etc.)  
4 During the study period, each MFIs could apply for rating by any of the raters but MFIs seem to have chosen raters 
with experience in their region.  
5 The Mixmarket information platform ranks the quality of the data collected for each MFI.  The data for this 
analysis come from MFIs ranked 4 and 5 stars, which indicates that the data are from audited financial statements, 
presumably with standard industry adjustment applied to it.  There is no qualitative difference between 4 and 5 
except that 5 have at least 3 years of financial statements report, while 4 have less than three years.  
6 The number of active borrowers, however, represents only one dimension of outreach.  To some stakeholders, the 
ability to reach poorer borrowers may be a better indicator of outreach than simply the number of active borrowers.  
The industry standard for this dimension is “depth of outreach” calculated as the ratio of average outstanding loan 
size divided by the per capita GNP.  Regression on a smaller sample with depth of outreach as the dependent 
produced poor results, however. 
7 LiabCh captures changes in borrowed funds from sources other than deposits.  
8 The lending practices of some MFIs require mandatory savings from their borrowers.  Only 4 MFIs in the sample 
explicitly indicated this but evidence suggests that there are more MFIs which use mandatory savings.  
Unfortunately, the data does not allow credible distinction between mandatory and voluntary savings.  
9 Originally, the per capita income and the GDP per country as a proxy of wealth level and size of the economy were 
included but, as they were highly correlated with country dummies, were consequently excluded from the analysis 
to prevent severe multi-collinearilty problems. 
10 Both RATE and FinAid can not be used as they are strongly correlated..    22
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Due to high level of correlation between LOAN and PAR, and CAPITAL and PAR, and given that the banking 
literature uses either of these ratios as a control for risk, two specifications are estimated: the first includes LOAN 
and CAPITAL which are not correlated (Model 3), and the second includes only PAR (Model 4). Results on are 
robust to specifications with different risk measures 
12 To calculate the precise magnitude the formula 100*[(exp(coefficient)-1] was used. 
13 This result was robust to alternative specifications. 
14 Results form the estimation using the sub-sample on Eastern Europe and Central Asia are not included since the 
model fit was poor and there were too few observations.   23
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Table 1. Distribution of sample MFIs and raters by geographic region.  
 





sample)  No (%  within 
region) 





74 18.78 3  4.05 
     Asia   M-CRIL 
 
77 19.56 2  5.56 







68 17.26 8 11.76 







146 37.06 37 25.34 





29 7.36 3   
10.34 
         Total    394  100  53   
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Table 2. Variable definition:  
Variable Definition 
OSS  Operational self-sufficiency = Operating revenue / (Financial expense + Loan 
Loss Provision + Operating Expense). Measures how well the MFI can cover its 
costs through operating revenues 
NAB  Logarithm of the number of current borrowers, that is the number of individuals 
that currently have an outstanding loan balance with the MFI or are responsible 
for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio 
RATING  1 if rated in the current year; usually based on previous years financial statements 
FinAid  1 if rating was paid for partially or in full by CGAP Rating Fund  
ACCION    Rating by Rater No.1 etc. recorded in the year it occurred 
CAPITAL  Total equity to total assets 
AGE; AGE2  Age of the MFI = number of years since inception; Age2=age squared  
SIZE  Logarithm of the total assets of the MFI. Total assets include all assets net of 
contra asset accounts such as the loan loss reserve and accumulated depreciation. 
SAVINGS  Ratio of saving to total assets 
LOAN  Ratio of loans outstanding to total assets; measures risk exposure 
a
PAR  Portfolio at Risk > 30 days 
Bank  1 if the MFI is organized as a bank, zero otherwise 
NGO  1 if the MFI is a NGO, zero otherwise 
INFLATION  GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars; source: IMF 
DEPOSIT  1 if the country has deposit insurance schemes 
a Most empirical models that study bank performance include LOAN as a measure of bank risk exposure. Unlike 
banks, however, most MFIs do not engage in income generating activities other than lending, therefore, LOAN not 
only controls for risk exposure but also for MFI focus on lending because using funds for other purposes such as 
new buildings, cars etc, is likely to affect income generation..   27




Panel A. Current Year 













OSS  1.049 1.238*** 1.449  1.228  1.182  1.470 
  (0.550)
 c (0.322)  (0.501)  (0.262)  (0.136)  (0.496) 
NAB  8.751 9.593*** 9.901  9.982  7.833  9.350 
  (2.124) (0.928) (0.695) (0.770)  (0.660)  (0.638) 
LiabCh  0.392 0.437 0.434 0.362  0.316  0.815 
  (0.732) (0.540) (0.472) (0.388)  (1.114)  (0.793) 
EqCh  0.267 0.196 0.017 0.170  0.277  0.216 
  (0.484) (0.380) (0.563) (0.363)  (0.225)  (0.343) 
CAPITAL  0.486 0.453 0.495 0.381  0.667  0.612 
  (0.328) (0.264) (0.229) (0.232)  (0.315)  (0.198) 
LOAN  0.664 0.736** 0.788  0.750  0.868  0.729 
  (0.202) (0.164) (0.180) (0.134)  (0.094)  (0.145) 
PAR  0.051 0.045 0.048 0.050  0.039  0.012 
  (0.086) (0.045) (0.038) (0.043)  (0.025)  (0.011) 
SIZE  14.801 16.007*** 16.183  16.444 15.048 15.325 
  (2.038) (1.108) (0.465) (0.892)  (0.820)  (0.926) 
AGE  7.805 10.051***  11.375  12.000  3.500  5.333 
  (6.544) (5.246) (4.069) (4.913)  (1.291)  (1.506) 
AGE2  103.641 128.09* 143.875 167.355  13.500  30.333 
  (186.260) (119.117) (122.425) (118.160)  (9.110)  (18.074) 
FinAid   0.310  0.000  0.258  1.000  0.500 
   (0.467)  0.000  (0.445)  0.000  (0.548) 
ACCION    0.138  0.032  0.000  0.167 
   (0.347)  (0.180)  0.000  (0.408) 
M-CRIL   0.017  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.131)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
MicroRate    0.517  0.125   0.000  0.000 
   (0.504)  (0.354)   0.000  0.000 
Microfinanza 
Ltd 
 0.069  0.000  0.000    0.000 
   (0.255)  0.000  0.000    0.000 
Planet Rating   0.121  0.125  0.000  0.000   
   (0.328)  (0.354)  0.000  0.000   
DEPOSIT  0.539 0.767 0.875 0.750  0.667  0.500 
  (0.499) (0.427) (0.354) (0.444)  (0.577)  (0.548) 
a  Rater 2 is not included due to the limited number of observations (2), 
b Means are estimated for the year for which 
rating occurred,  
c Standard errors are in the parenthesis. 
*difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 10% level, ** difference in means 
between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 5% level, ***difference in means between rated and non-
rated statistically significant at the 1% level    28
Table 3. Summary statistics by non-rated, rated, and individual rater
a 
 
Panel B. Previous Year 














c  1.018  1.171**  1.328 1.171 1.050 1.411 
  (0.532)
d  (0.294) (0.444) (0.258) (0.297) (0.496) 
L_NABb  8.549  9.269***  9.824 9.612 7.545 8.893 
  (2.166)  (1.049) (0.767) (0.857) (0.552) (0.508) 
L_CAPITAL  0.498  0.498 0.604 0.408 0.709 0.721 
  (0.330)  (0.291) (0.282) (0.252) (0.301) (0.206) 
L_LOAN  0.656  0.723*  0.899 0.727 0.850 0.692 
  (0.206)  (0.179) (0.053) (0.132) (0.069) (0.181) 
L_PAR  0.052  0.045 0.042 0.052 0.046 0.032 
  (0.080)  (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.026) (0.069) 
L_ SAVINGS   0.142  0.144 0.090 0.159 0.000 0.052 
  (0.222)  (0.222) (0.239) (0.216) (0.000) (0.135) 
L_SIZE  14.602 15.722***  16.031  16.198 14.682 14.939 
  (2.043)  (1.233) (0.451) (0.948) (0.889) (0.902) 
L_AGE  7.076 9.125***  10.571  11.276  2.500  4.333 
  (6.387)  (5.312) (4.353) (4.935) (1.291) (1.506) 
a Rater 2 is not included due to the limited number of observations (2) 
b Means are estimated for the year for which rating occurred. 
c L stands for the variable lagged one period. 
 
d Standard errors are in the parenthesis.
 
* difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 10% level,  
** difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 5% level,  
*** difference in means between rated and non-rated statistically significant at the 1% level    29
Table 4. Random effect estimates of rating impact on sustainability, measured by OSS 





RATING  - 0 . 0 0 2          
  ( 0 . 0 3 )          
FinAid   0.055    0.152     
   (0.61)    (2.28)**     
ACCION     0.250  0.142   0.232    
    (1.51)  (0.77)   (2.66)***    
M-CRIL    0.457  0.517   0.044    
    (1.31)  (1.52)   (0.91)    
MicroRate     0.007  0.002      
    (0.07)  (0.02)      
Microfinanza Ltd    -0.417  -0.433    -0.447  -0.544 
    (1.88)*  (1.98)**    (1.53)  (1.80)* 
PlaNet Rating    0.197  0.198    -0.085  -0.132 
    (1.39)  (1.30)    (0.39)  (0.59) 
PAR     0.300     -1.075 
     ( 0 . 9 6 )      ( 1 . 6 0 )  
CAPITAL  0.171 0.170 0.187   0.149 0.167 0.228  
  (1.36) (1.38) (1.52)   (1.11) (1.25) (1.31)  
LOAN  0.335 0.343 0.348   0.003 0.043 0.736  
  (1.95)*  (2.02)**  (2.05)**    (0.02) (0.27) (1.91)*   
SIZE  0.084 0.085 0.083 0.123 0.120 0.117 0.119 0.204 
  (2.74)*** (2.82)*** (2.74)*** (4.46)*** (3.23)*** (3.16)*** (1.38)  (2.26)** 
AGE  0.051 0.049 0.049 0.070 0.041 0.041 0.377 0.488 
  (2.85)*** (2.81)*** (2.77)*** (4.60)*** (2.44)**  (2.51)**  (1.90)*  (2.51)** 
AGE2  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.033 -0.052 
  (3.24)*** (3.22)*** (3.16)*** (4.94)*** (3.22)*** (3.29)*** (1.43)  (2.33)** 
NGO  0.163 0.159 0.158 0.214 -0.028  -0.019  0.061 -0.085 
  (1.28) (1.28) (1.24) (2.17)**  (0.20) (0.14) (0.47) (0.56) 
BANK  -0.054 -0.060 -0.053 -0.181 -0.225 -0.227    
  (0.28) (0.32) (0.27) (1.13) (1.08) (1.10)    
INFLATION  0.647 0.673 0.646 0.934 -0.797  -0.758  3.747 3.203 
  (1.78)* (1.87)* (1.82)* (2.49)**  (0.86)  (0.82)  (3.13)***  (2.64)*** 
DEPOSIT  0.103 0.107 0.174 0.253 0.207 -0.670  -0.599  -0.477 
  (0.84) (0.88) (1.41) (1.99)**  (0.99) (1.65)*  (2.01)**  (1.61) 
Constant  -0.844 -1.648 -1.669 -2.015 -1.098 -0.372 -1.430 -1.666 
  (1.31) (2.31)**  (2.33)**  (3.20)***  (1.78)*  (0.81) (1.05) (2.30)** 
Observations  366 379 379 320 116 116 70OLS  68 
          
Number of id  115 115 115 108 36  36     
Overall R2  0.49 0.49 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.75 0.74 
Chi 2  145 147 155 205 49  53  0.62 
AdjR2 
0.59 
BP  48 48 51 36 39 40 5.7  F  5.11  F 
Rho  0.60 0.60 0.62 0.44 0.78 0.78    
1 Latin America sample 
2 Eastern Europe and Central Asia sample  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           30
Table 5. Random effect estimates of rating impact on outreach, measured by NAB 




RATING    0.169 0.151 0.358 0.325  
    (1.83)* (1.65)* (2.15)**  (1.95)*  
FinAid        -0.411 
        ( 2 . 0 8 ) * *  
ACCION    0.299       
  (1.26)       
M-CRIL  0.081       
  (0.16)       
MicroRate    0.049       
  (0.42)       
Microfinanza 
Ltd 
-0.325       
  (1.13)       
PlaNet  Rating  -0.056       
  (0.25)       
PAR     -0.049    -3.371  0.317 
     (0.11)    (1.76)*  (0.44) 
CAPITAL 0.161  0.119    0.169     
 (0.91)  (0.67)    (0.32)     
LOAN 1.334  1.323    0.528     
 (6.04)***  (6.01)***    (0.91)     
SIZE  0.768  0.761 0.837 0.685 0.811 0.745 
 (15.39)***  (15.11)***  (15.59)***  (4.86)***  (5.26)***  (4.81)*** 
AGE 0.005  0.005  0.005  -0.001  -0.001  -0.287 
  (0.30)  (0.31) (0.27) (0.02) (0.02) (1.22) 
NGO  0.202  0.204 0.274 0.333 0.501 0.740 
  (0.86)  (0.87) (1.13) (0.70) (1.02) (1.43) 
Bank  -0.506  -0.534 -0.637 -0.163 -0.382  
  (1.48)  (1.56) (1.64) (0.24) (0.54)  
INFLATION  -0.055  -0.022 -0.418 -1.920 -1.463 0.600 
  (0.11)  (0.04) (0.86) (0.73) (0.56) (0.48) 
Constant -6.973  -6.915  -3.876  3.574 2.936 -3.869 
 (5.78)***  (5.72)***  (3.09)***  (2.02)**  (1.52)  (2.11)** 
Observations  449  431 364 128 116 70 
Number of id  135  135  127  46  44  22 
Overall R2   0.86  0.86  0.86  0.62  0.62  0.89 
Chi2    1138  1132  966 102 98  336 
BP 225  200  190  52  46  305 
Pho  0.76  0.76 0.81 0.75 0.78 0.87 
1 Latin America sample 
2 Eastern Europe and Central Asia sample  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%           31
Table 6. OLS of rating impact on log changes in liability. 
  (2) (3) (1) (1) (4)EE  (4)EE  (5)LA 
R A T I N G   - 0 . 1 2 4         
  ( 0 . 5 0 )         
FinAid   -0.162       
   ( 0 . 4 6 )        
ACCION      -0.452  -0.721    -0.571 
    (0.63)  (1.04)    (1.58) 
M-CRIL    -0.785  -0.263     
    (0.63)  (0.23)     
MicroRate      0.185  0.181    -0.027 
    (0.49)  (0.53)    (0.18) 
Microfinanza  Ltd      -0.486  -1.556  0.429 0.324  
      (0.41) (1.38) (0.25) (0.21)  
PlaNet  Rating      1.182 0.765 2.106 2.870  
     (2.01)**  (1.37)  (2.34)**  (3.46)***   
SIZE  -0.100 -0.102 -0.141 -0.106 0.061  -0.024 -0.040 
  (1.36) (1.39) (1.51) (1.45) (0.11) (0.05) (0.50) 
L_AGE  -0.012 -0.012 -0.003 -0.014 -0.028 -0.671 -0.007 
  (0.70) (0.70) (0.18) (0.88) (0.05) (1.24) (0.72) 
L_PAR   -0.853    0.423   
    (0.52)    (0.16)   
L_LOAN  0.242 0.264   0.281 -0.822    0.820 
  (0.46) (0.50)   (0.53) (0.45)   (1.86)* 
L_CAPITAL 1.354 1.359   1.272 0.685   1.437 
  (3.86)*** (3.85)***   (3.59)*** (0.78)    (3.73)*** 
INFLATION 0.231 0.335 -0.583  0.236 -26.861  -26.914  3.004 
  (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.07) (1.94)*  (2.13)*  (0.88) 
L_SAVINGS 0.861 0.838 0.912 0.855 -43.635  -37.442  0.742 
  (1.69)*  (1.65) (1.36) (1.69)*  (0.71) (0.63) (2.09)** 
L_DEPOSIT 1.997 2.028 2.027 3.020 4.080 4.815 0.419 
  (2.39)** (2.40)** (1.76)*  (2.82)***  (1.76)*  (2.31)** (0.48) 
NGO  -0.104 -0.099 -0.072 -0.097 0.271  -0.180 0.010 
  (0.40) (0.38) (0.22) (0.37) (0.42) (0.25) (0.04) 
Bank  -0.276 -0.278 -0.537 -0.287   0.000  -0.175 
  (0.81) (0.81) (1.21) (0.84)   (.)  (0.71) 
Constant -0.812  -0.835  -0.055 -1.837 -5.589 0.292  -0.720 
  (0.45) (0.46) (0.03) (0.96) (0.86) (0.04) (0.76) 
         
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Country  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations  232 232 189 232 39  36  68 
R-squared  0.47 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.74 0.82 0.55 
Adj  R2  0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.54 0.36 
Ftest  3.04 3.03 2.73 2.91 2.11 2.97 2.48 
 
1 Latin America sample 
2 Eastern Europe and Central Asia sample  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   32
     
Table 7. OLS of rating impact on log changes in equity. 
  (1) (1) (2) (3) LA (5)LA 
 eqch  eqch  eqch  eqch eqch eqch 
RATING    0.080     
    ( 0 . 8 0 )      
FinAid     0.127    
     ( 0 . 9 0 )     
ACCION    0.449*  0.464    0.391  0.455 
  (1.67)  (1.53)    (1.73)*  (2.10)** 
M-CRIL  -0.123  -0.171      
  (0.26)  (0.32)      
MicroRate    0.090  0.053    0.118  0.106 
  (0.65)  (0.33)    (1.23)  (1.03) 
Microfinanza  Ltd  0.201  0.215      
  (0.48)  (0.48)      
PlaNet  Rating  -0.264  -0.425      
  (1.19)  (1.73)*      
SIZE  -0.113 -0.103 -0.114 -0.113 -0.057 -0.015 
  (3.52)*** (2.54)**  (3.60)*** (3.57)*** (1.35)  (0.30) 
L_AGE -0.001  -0.006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.017 -0.018 
  (0.20) (0.78) (0.34) (0.33) (2.62)**  (2.53)** 
L_PAR   -0.117     -1.287 
   (0.15)     (0.95) 
L_LOAN  0.242   0.262 0.242 0.482  
  (1.13)   (1.25) (1.14) (1.95)*   
L_CAPITAL  -0.730   -0.737 -0.742 -0.539  
  (4.65)***   (4.76)*** (4.78)*** (2.26)**   
INFLATION  0.238 -0.719  0.329 0.253 -0.610  -0.903 
  (0.19) (0.48) (0.27) (0.20) (0.29) (0.42) 
L_SAVINGS  0.091 0.180 0.090 0.106 0.135 0.232 
  (0.42) (0.62) (0.42) (0.49) (0.63) (1.03) 
L_DEPOSIT  -0.705 -0.707 -0.612 -0.632 0.350  -0.499 
  (2.05)** (1.85)*  (2.11)** (2.17)** (1.48)  (0.87) 
NGO  0.109 0.062 0.102 0.098 0.446 0.548 
  (1.09) (0.48) (1.03) (0.98) (2.89)***  (2.98)*** 
Bank  0.185 0.288 0.177 0.178 0.120 -0.028 
  (1.20) (1.41) (1.15) (1.16) (0.79) (0.18) 
Constant  2.342 1.783 1.048 1.042 0.441 0.169 
  (3.34)***  (2.36)** (2.06)** (2.05)** (0.60)  (0.34) 
        
Country  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Year  Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations  243 200 243 243 70  65 
R-squared  0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.50 0.51 
Adj  R2  0.17 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.30 0.31 
F  1.86 1.47 1.95 1.95 2.49 2.49 
1 Latin America sample 
2 Eastern Europe and Central Asia sample  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%         33
Appendix: 
 
Table 1: Numbers of MFIs by country in the sample and their share in the population
1 
 Country  Sample  Population
1 




Albania* 3  0.79  8  0.32  2.49 
Armenia* 10  2.63  12  0.48  5.54 
B&H* 24  6.32  19  0.75  8.39 
Bangladesh* 9  2.37  384  15.21  0.16 
Bolivia* 27  7.11  20  0.79  8.97 
Bulgaria* 2  0.53  8  0.32  1.66 
Cambodia* 12  3.16  30  1.19  2.66 
Cameroon 1  0.26  56  2.22  0.12 
Colombia* 21  5.53  18  0.71  7.75 
Dominican Republic*  6  1.58  11  0.44  3.62 
Ecuador* 3  0.79  13  0.52  1.53 
Egypt* 4  1.05  18  0.71  1.48 
Ethiopia 5  1.32  30  1.19  1.11 
Georgia* 4  1.05  13  0.52  2.04 
Ghana* 3  0.79  51  2.02  0.39 
Guatemala 3  0.79  25  0.99  0.80 
Haiti* 4  1.05  14  0.55  1.90 
Honduras* 5  1.32  13  0.52  2.55 
India* 19  5.00  666  26.39  0.19 
Indonesia* 6  1.58  127  5.03  0.31 
Jordan* 8  2.11  3  0.12  17.71 
Kazakhstan* 5  1.32 24  0.95  1.38 
Kenya* 11  2.89  93  3.68  0.79 
Kyrgyz Republic  3  0.79  21  0.83  0.95 
Madagascar* 7  1.84  5  0.20  9.30 
Mali 3  0.79  22  0.87  0.91 
Mexico* 18  4.74  36  1.43  3.32 
Mongolia* 5  1.32  3  0.12  11.07 
Morocco* 7  1.84  8  0.32  5.81 
Mozambique* 6  1.58  4  0.16  9.96 
Nepal* 4  1.05  89  3.53  0.30 
Nicaragua* 13  3.42  19  0.75  4.54 
Nigeria 8  2.11  118  4.68  0.45 
Pakistan* 9  2.37  35  1.39  1.71 
Paraguay* 3  0.79  3  0.12  6.64   34
Peru** 30  7.89  37  1.47  5.39 





 No  %  No  %   
Philippines* 8  2.11  101  4.00  0.53 
Republic 3  0.79  17  0.67  1.17 
Republic* 3  0.79  10  0.40  1.99 
Russia 3  0.79  73  2.89  0.27 
Rwanda* 3  0.79  9  0.36  2.21 
Senegal 4  1.05  16  0.63  1.66 
Slovakia* 3  0.79  124  4.91  0.16 
Tajikistan 3  0.79  22  0.87  0.91 
Tanzania* 4  1.05  21  0.83  1.27 
Togo* 11  2.89  22  0.87  3.32 
Turkey* 1  0.26  1  0.04  6.64 
Uganda* 18  4.74  47  1.86  2.54 
FR Yugoslavia  5  1.32  5  0.20  6.64 
Total 380  100  2524  100   
 
1 Data comprising the population in a country come from the Micro Credit Summit Project. 
 
 2 Sample proportion divided by population proportion 
* MFIs from that country are overrepresented in the sample.   35
 
Table 2. List of MFIs included in the analysis 
Name   Country  Name   Country 
ABA Egypt  EMT  Cambodia 
ACAD  Palestine    FADES  Bolivia   
ACLEDA  Cambodia  FADU  Nigeria   
ACLEDA  Cambodia    FAMA  Nicaragua   
ACME  Haiti  FATEN  Palestine   
ACODEP  Nicaragua  Faulu - KEN  Kenya   
ACSI  Ethiopia  Faulu - UGA  Uganda   
ACTUAR - Tolima  Colombia    FCC  Mozambique   
ACTUAR Famiempresas - Antioquia  Colombia    FIE  Bolivia   
ADEFI Madagascar      FINADEV  Benin 
Adelante  Honduras    Finamerica  Colombia   
ADMIC  Mexico    Finca - TAN  Tanzania   
ADOPEM  Dominican Republic    Finca - UGA  Uganda   
Agency for Finance in Kosovo  Yugoslavia    FINCA Armenia  Armenia   
AgroCapital  Bolivia    FINCOMUN  Mexico   
AKRSP  Pakistan    FINDE  Nicaragua   
Al Amana  Morocco    FMSD  Colombia 
AREGAK  Armenia    FONDECO  Bolivia   
ASDEB  Togo    FORA   Russia 
Asian Credit Fund  Kazakhstan    G￿esis Empreserial  Guatemala   
Banco Solidario  Ecuador    Hattha Kaksekar  Cambodia 
BancoSol  Bolivia    IDF  Bangladesh   
BASIX  India    IMED  India   
Bay Tushum  Kyrgyz Republic  Independencia  Mexico   
Bay Tushum   Kyrgyz  Republic  Integra Foundation  Slovakia   
BDB  Indonesia    JMCC  Jordan   
BES  India    Kamurj  Armenia   
BRAC  Bangladesh    KCLF  Kazakhstan 
BRI  Indonesia    KEP  Kosovo   
CARD Bank  Philippines    KSF  Ghana   
CCA Cameroon  MAYA  Turkey 
CERUDEB  Uganda    MFW  Jordan   
CMAC - Maynas  Peru    MiBanco  Peru   
CMAC - Sullana  Peru    MI-BOSPO Tuzla  B&H   
Compartamos  Mexico  MICRA (Founder CRS)  B&H   
Compartamos  Mexico    Microfond Kardjali  Bulgaria   
Constanta Foundation  Georgia    MIKROFIN, Banja Luka  B&H   
Crear - Arequipa  Peru    NABW (Microcredit Centre)       Tajikistan 
Crear - Tacna  Peru    Nirdhan  Nepal   
DEC  Nigeria    NLCL  Pakistan   
EBS  Kenya    Novo Banco  Mozambique   
Eco Futuro  Bolivia    OPIC-TOGO  Togo   
EDYFICAR  Peru    PADME  Benin   
EKI WV  B&H    PAMECAS  Senegal   
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List of MFIs included in the analysis (Continued) 
Name   Country 
Partner Mikrokreditna Organizacija  B&H   
PRIZMA B&H     
PRODEM  Bolivia   
PROEMPRESA  Peru   
ProMujer - Bolivia  Bolivia   
ProMujer Peru  Peru   
PROSHIKA  Bangladesh   
PSHM  Albania   
SEAP  Nigeria   
SEEDS  Sri Lanka   
SEF  South Africa   
SIPEM Madagascar     
SKS  India   
SMEP Kenya     
SOGESOL Haiti 
Spandana  India   
SY  Mali   
TSPI Philippines     
Urwego Rwanda     
UWFT  Uganda   
Visi￿ de Finanzas  Paraguay   
WAGES  Togo   
WWB - Cali  Colombia   
WWB - Medell￿  Colombia   
XacBank Mongolia 
Zakoura  Morocco   
 
  
 